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TTIF. inilLOSOPHY OF DR. McTAGGART
BY GILBERT T. SADLER
SINCE the publication of the second volume of The Nature of
Existence which completes the work of this great Cambridge
philosopher, Dr. McTaggart's credit has steadil} risen. He was
known in his lifetime as a brilliant debater and inspiring teacher:
but, though he had published important works, ^ his great system of
philosophy was only partially delivered to the public at the time of
his death. It can now be studied in its completeness in the two vol-
umes of The Xature of Existence. This work is the positive and
logical presentation of what McTaggart desired to say. His pre-
\ious works on llegel and Some Dogmas of Religion had ])rei)arc(l
the way for this last remarkable effort. Ilriefly, he believed the uni-
verse to be souls related in groups or primary wholes, or in one
jirimary whole, i)erhai)s. Their unit}" is a unit}' of S}slem, not a
unit}' in one Person or Super- Person or God or Unitive Mind. It
is like a state, consisting of men. Thus McTaggart was both a
Pluralist and a Monist ; a I'luraHst rs to the sou's of which realit}'
was composed: and a Zionist as to the unif}ing love which united
or related souls to one another, in varying degrees of love.
Such, in brief, was the philosophical result of }ears of stu ly,
discussion and tuition at Cambridge. Drafts of his books used to
be submitted by McTaggart. to his friendly critics at Cambridge,
ere he published his works.
It is necessary to state the main philosophical argument of \'o\
I of The Nature of Existence, and then an estimate can be made
of the value of the second volume recentl}' published. X'olume I
1 His principal publications are : Studies in Hcyclian Dialectic, Cambridge,
1896; Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Cambridge. 1901; Some Dog)nas of
Religion. London, 1906; The Jactation of Time and Eternity, Berkeley, 1908;
A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, Cambridge, 1910; The .Waturc of E.ristence.
Vol. I, Cambridge, 1921 ; The Nature of E.vistence. Vol. //, Cambridge, 1927.
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declared that oiilx souls or sck'cs exist, and their parts are percep-
tions, xchich are diiisible ad infinitum. All selves are related, each
loving one other or a few, or a group of other souls or selves. Each
is unique, and so has a sufficient description. No two plants, ani-
mals or men are exactly- alike.
What exists then is souls, and so groups of souls, and parts of
souls, and their perceptions : briefly, souls and their perceptions.
And all are related and form a universe, whose unity is not a God
of any kind, but it is love in all stages or degrees. Every substance
(viz. selves, parts of selves, and groups of selves) is in relation to
each other, and so each is unique, and with an infinit}' of relation-
ships or qualities. Each self (or group of such, or parts of such)
is unique to some extent, and so has a sufficient description. Each
has a varying relatedness, or relationships. So each has an exclusive
description. Characteristics are inter-dependent, and some deter-
mine others, or cause others. Hegel said that everything is de-
termined by everything else. The universe is an organic unity, and
the parts manifest the whole. There is an inner teleologw The
parts are alive and in relation. So the whole is an organic or living
unity, not a unity of composition, like a book of words. The uni-
verse is of living parts overlapping with "enormous complexity."
But now a difficulty occurs, and it may be best represented by an
example. Take a family of two brothers the parents being dead.
The famil}' is real, but it only now consists of two brothers. Each
man has love to the other one, in some degree. But the idea of a
family does not of itself give us reality, as it presupposes people but
does not describe them. The\' might be father and son, or widow
and sons, and so forth. A\'e cannot reach realitv except b\' over-
coming such presuppositions and finding real persons who give
us something sure, for the\' onl\- have parts within parts to infinit}'.
Every substance, being unique, must haz'e a sufficient descript'ou.
So groups of souls (say a family) and souls, and parts of souls
(their perceptions) must have, each, a sufficient description. Xow
we can only realise that if the parts are perceptions, and if such are
determined or influenced b}' other souls. A ^ a group, say a familw
B and C ^ 2 sons, the only parts left of the family of A. These
perceive ( and love to some extent, therefore ) one another, and so
cause one another to feel such love; i.e. each has a part (or per-
ception) determined by the other, corresponding to the other. Selves
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and iht'ir i)arts are the sole reality. Selves are the realities that
cicteniiiiic their parts of other selves (= perceptions of other souls,
or of parts of souls, or of groups of souls). Perception is the only
power by which we can get an infinite series of parts within parts
to infinity viz. l'> perceives C, i.e. loves C in some degree. So C
determines a part of B, viz. B's perception of a love to C. C educes
that perception or love. C determines B in that part of B. B may
love others also, or have a faint affection to others, and again com-
plaisance to yet others; and all for C's sake. "Love me, love my
dog" even! McTaggart works out these implications of love in de-
tail. We get then B ! C. B loves C. C determines that part or per-
ception of 15. B! 1)! C^ V> perceives that he, 15. ])erceives C; and
so on infinitely if we desire to pursue the ])erceptions of percep-
tions.
r>ut McTaggart saws no one really does pursue it down and
down. Enough that we have found realit)' as souls, and their ])er-
ceptive love to other souls.
McTaggart shows us that if we do not love we are not reall\-
ourselves. We ma\' be clever animals, or rich citizens, but we have
not found ( i.e. felt ) our eternal nature. We doom ourselves to a
terrible awakening some da}-. "Determining correspondence ' is
tints a relation betzvccn souls, i.e. between a soul C, and part of
another soul B. 15! C = B perceives (and so loves) C, in some
degree or sense of the term perception. C determines a part of B
thus. Xo tw(j souls are alike : each is unique, and so had a unit|ue
description.
The King of England 1500 .\. D. = Henry \'I I, and no one else.
Each soul has an infinity of parts, for no soul is simple, or a single
fact.
I5ut realit\- is souls, parts of souls, and grou])s of souls, or selves.
If we take groups of souls we get no true infmity of parts, for
there is no sufficient description possible of a group of souls. The
group presupposes males or females, young or old souls in its group,
and we need to go to the souls themselves to get a sufficient de-
scription. Xor can the parts of souls give us sufficient descriptions.
They again presuppose various powers in the souls. We need, then,
to fix our attention on the unique souls of the uniz-erse. They
alone give us an infinite divisibility that is not a vicious infinite by
endless presuppositions. Our souls have implications, viz., our per-
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ceptions of one another, and their parts within parts to iniinity.
It is impossible to reach reaHty—substances with sufficient descrip-
tions—bv a category or description such as "family," for it does
not decide what the parts of it are: they may be husband and wife
and child, or brother and sister, and so forth. It presupposes so
many possibilities. We must get to a category which tells of some-
thing that is unique and self-contained, and from which the joarts
are implied ad infinitum.
The only categor\' is a self. When we reach selves we have
substances, spiritual substances whose parts are perceptions, and
their ])arts are perce[)tions of these perceptions, and so on ad in-
fiiiiluui.
Hence reality is selves or souls, all eternal and related, and per-
ceiving other souls, and loving in some degree whom thev perceive
:
for there can be no real perception without some degree of svmpathy
or love.
The universe is such souls, in one or more primary wholes or
groups of souls, and perhaps all in one such wdiole or gathering of
inter-related souls of all stages, degrees, kinds, in some attitude of
love, and its joy. The argument of McTaggart is of this nature.
To recapitulate—substances are souls of all degrees, and their parts,
which are perceptions. But such exist in and by their relatedness.
If I see a stone. I see lowly souls or selves. All is alive, in some
degree: and all is related to some other souls, and to their parts or
perceptions. Xow no substance (i.e. self) is simple. It is divisible,
and divisible therefore infinitel}-, for its ])arts are divisible.
But groups of souls give us no intinite divisibility, for the\- have
no definite relatedness to souls. So with parts of souls. The\' give
us no starting-point for an infinite divisibilitv of parts. These
(groups or parts) presuppose various souls below or above them,
and they (the groups or parts) have no sufficient and unique descrip-
tion. Only souls can give us infinite divisibilitv. From them pro-
ceed parts, viz. perceptions, and they have parts, viz. perception of
a perception, and so on down ad inf. They imply their parts within
parts. Groups and parts of souls only presuppose a varietN' of parts,
giving us a vicious infinite.
In volume II McTaggart deals with the probable rather than the
necessary facts. He declares that souls are not in time, that matter
does not exist, and that love really unites soids, each to one or a few
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Other souls. Love is not pity merely, resulting in almsgiving, as in
some religions. It is real emotional love to a person or persons.
Hence such persons are eternal, for love is inexhaustible in its
nature. Their perceptions are really grades of love to other souls,
or to what are dreaming souls, as forms of so-called "matter."
We thus come to the many themes with which our author deals.
.Is to "matter," McTaggart says it is reall\' souls or selves of a low
order. It seems to ha\e ])rimary qualities (as size, shape, position,
mobility and impenetrability, excluding other forms of "matter"),
and secondary cjualities (as colour, hardness, smell, taste and
sound). The latter are effects produced by something on an ob-
serving object. "Matter" cannot exist, as it has no parts within
parts to infinity. Even space is now said to be made up of "in-
divisible points of matter," and so does not exist. There can, then,
be no "determining correspondence" as to matter, and so it does not
exist. It has no perceptions of souls, and perceptions of those per-
ceptions. As to the idea of Cod, McTaggart discussed it in Some
Dogmas of Religion, and concluded there could be no Omnipotent
God. and no non-Omnipotent God either. In \ olume II of The
Xotiirc of Exister.ce, we have a chapter on the subject. "Xo self
can be part of another self." "Every primary part is a self." So
there can be no All-inclusive self, as God. If God be one self among
many selves, He would not be creative of selves. AM selves must
have come into existence together, or else be eternal. So there is no
God, either Creative or L'nitive. As to time, there is no A-series of
l^ast, ])resent or future: and no B-series of earlier and later events:
though we believe these to exist. But there is a C-series of ex-
pressions to us of eternal events: as we read a book in stages, which
yet exists all the time and all at once. So we count 12 3... or .\
B C whereas numbers and the alphabet exist all at once, and
all the time.
History is of e\ents which reall\ and eternally inler])enetrate
;
in a timeless order of souls, of love and their relations to one an-
other. "W'e have come to the conclusion that there is no real A
series and no real 15 series (before and after), and no real time-
series." ( ]>. 30.) Yet there is a real series, but it is not a time
series. This is the real C series, felt by us in mispercej)tions, not
entirelx' erroneous. The terms in it are really connected by per-
manent relations, like .\, B, C. . . . our experiences of time occur in a
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"specious present" ; in what seems to be a "present," as opposed
to past and future. There is no such thing really. We have ex-
periences which really are aspects of our external experience.
We misperceive the C-series (a reality) as if it were a B series
of earlier and later facts of experience. The C-series actually ex-
ist, in eternity. In regard to iiuiiwrtalifv ; AIcTaggart believed aU
souls to be eternal in an eternal present. The "C-series" is mis-
conceived as if it were the B series of events before or after any
given event. The C-series is not a time-series. It moves from less
inclusive to more inclusive realit}' : and such a process is outside
time.
"All that exists is really timeless. What seems future is present
in some sense now." "The system of the determining correspon-
dence parts is the universe, since it contains all existing content."
"If heaven is timeless, it cannot be really future."
"Selves, though not in time, appear as in time" (.372).
"The same is true of all parts of selves which are determined
by determining correspondence : viz. the perceptions which each
self contains of selves and of parts of selves to infinity." "Nothing
is really past, for nothing is an event in time."
Thus, our ordinary- events, as having a breakfast and writing a
letter, are related to other events in our self-manifestation. In
that series we are but partly expressing ourselves. We exist as a
whole eternally but we parti}' express ourselves, and call that our
"life" here, or a series of such lives, bv reincarnations. We are
more than we think we are.
What is the heart of ez'ery soul, then, but love? AIcTaggart d'S-
cusses this in great detail, and with a very great insight. It is an
astonishing piece of work to find, in a philosophical book, the power
and enthusiasm of a soul of love, freely given to us.
"The entire life of each self centres round and depends on his
love for other selves, and, as I believe, it is loz'e zvhich is the su-
preme value of life .... Love has no end but itself" ( II p. 392).
"I shall never permanently lose my friend or his love."
"A se'f will love every other self whom he perceives directlv."
In the future, beyond death, after our reincarnations here, love will
be stronger and more joyous than here and now. Barriers will be
swept aside. "Unity will be unhampered." Uncongenial qualities
will be largely overcome, in "absolute reality." All perceptions of
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Other selves will be states of love. They ever are such states really,
but we misperceive them here on earth. "Absolute reality is time-
less and .... infinite." (p. 160). Love here cannot keep perma-
nently in its intensity. We are drawn aside by life's toil. I'ut in
the full life to come love will be free, unfettered, ecstatic even. l')\
determining correspondence (n!C = C influences or determines
r>, and so 1> perceives or loves C) one soul differentiates anf)ther.
.\ chain of causation runs tlir()Ui,di the universe then.
There is, then, no space (no fi.xed lengths of miles) and no time
(no fixed exjieriences of \ears). but o)ily souls in hn-c with souls:
and thus kindly to all who are associated with llu' l)elo\ed sou's;
and conijjlaisant to aH parts of the beloved soul or sou's.
And if the beloved one has faults, even these are tolerated, if not
a cause of enhancing the love felt to that soul, h^jr shadow can
relieve and make brighter tints more beautiful. McTaggart en-
deavoured to show and explain ihc evils of life. He has treated
"Evil" as error, \ice. ])ain and disharmony. Hut what of loneliness,
ennui, disappointment, over-work, a nagging wife or husband, pov-
erty, fear of death, disease, ph\sical weakness without pain, being
hated or hating another?
In the last section of The Xature of Existence, our author wa'ote
"There may await each of us, and perhaps each of us in man}- dif-
ferent lives, delusions, cries, suffering, hatred, as great as or
greater than an}- which we now know. .Ml that we can say is that
this evil, however great it may be, is only passing. The final stage
is one in which the good infinitely exceeds all the evil in the series
b}- which it is attained. Of the nature of the good we know some-
thing. We know that it is a time'ess and endless state of love,—love
so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystic
rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection. We
know that we shall know nothing but our beloved, and those they
love, and ourselves as loving them, and that only in this shall we
seek and find satisfaction. Between the present and that fruition
there stretches a future which ma}- well need courage. For, while
there will be in it much good and increasing good, there may await
us evils which we can now measure only by their infinite insignifi-
cance as compared with the final reward."
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